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ABSTRACT—Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court and most 
First Amendment scholars have taken the position that the primary reason 
why the First Amendment protects freedom of speech is to advance 
democratic self-governance. In this Article, I will argue that this position, 
while surely correct insofar as it goes, is also radically incomplete. The 
fundamental problem is that the Court and, until recently, scholars have 
focused exclusively on the Religion Clauses and the Free Speech Clause. 
The rest of the First Amendment—the Press, Assembly, and Petition 
Clauses—might as well not exist. The topic of this Article is the five 
rights—speech, press, assembly, association, and petition—that I call the 
Democratic First Amendment. 
I will argue that the Democratic First Amendment is best read to adopt 
a particular vision of citizenship, one associated with the Democratic 
Republican philosophy of Thomas Jefferson and his allies. Citizens, on this 
view, are meant to be active in a myriad of ways, to engage with and even 
challenge their elected representatives, and to develop and communicate 
their values and opinions jointly, through assemblies and associations. It 
stands in sharp contrast to the passive form of citizenship, limited to 
biennial voting, favored by Jefferson’s Federalist adversaries. Each of the 
rights of the Democratic First Amendment, I show, advance this kind of 
democracy. More importantly, these rights are, to use the Supreme Court’s 
term, “cognate,” and must be exercised in combination to enable 
meaningful and active citizenship. The First Amendment, in short, is not 
just democratic, it is also kaleidoscopic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly taken 
the position that the primary—albeit not necessarily the only—reason why 
the First Amendment protects freedom of speech is to advance democratic 
self-governance.1 Moreover, there is also broad consensus among First 
Amendment scholars supporting this view.2 In this Article, I will argue that 
this position, while surely correct insofar as it goes, is also radically 
incomplete. 
The Court’s ruminations about the purpose of the Free Speech Clause 
fail to answer three overlapping questions. First, what is the relevance of 
the fact the Free Speech Clause does not stand alone, but rather is 
accompanied by other equally important provisions? Second, how exactly 
does the Free Speech Clause, in combination with those other provisions, 
advance self-governance? And third, what role does the First Amendment 
as a whole envision for citizens in a representative democracy? These are 
important questions, requiring careful consideration that they have not yet 
received. 
The problem starts with the Supreme Court. One noteworthy feature 
of the Supreme Court’s modern First Amendment jurisprudence is that it is 
not truly a First Amendment jurisprudence at all; rather, it is a series of 
decisions interpreting the Religion Clauses and the Free Speech Clause. 
The rest of the First Amendment—the Press, Assembly, and Petition 
1 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
33–35 (2012) (summarizing cases expounding democratic reading of the Free Speech Clause); Walker 
v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (“[T]he Free Speech
Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public, who are then able to influence
the choices of a government . . . .”). 
2 Bhagwat, supra note 1, at 32–33 (summarizing scholarship). 
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Clauses—might as well not exist. The Press Clause has been entirely 
subsumed by the Free Speech Clause.3 The Assembly Clause has not been 
addressed in over thirty years.4 The relevance of the Petition Clause has 
been limited to the peripheral issue of access to courts5—and even in that 
sphere, a recent decision limits its independent significance.6 Even the 
nontextual right of association, which has not been entirely abandoned, has 
been made subservient to free speech, even though historically the right 
clearly derived from the Assembly Clause.7 
For a long time, First Amendment scholarship was similarly blinkered. 
Recent years, however, have seen an explosion of scholarship examining 
the history and meaning of the rest of the First Amendment, especially the 
Assembly and Petition Clauses.8 This scholarship is extremely valuable, but 
it too suffers from a flaw: it fails to take seriously the proposition that 
democratic rights protected by the First Amendment are not independent 
points, but rather are deeply interrelated and overlapping.9 And it is 
impossible to fully understand how these rights function, as well as the 
vision of democratic citizenship they advance, without taking into account 
that interrelationship. 
The topic of this Article, then, is those five rights—speech, press, 
association, assembly, and petition—what I call the Democratic First 
Amendment. Each of these rights has independent significance, but they 
also operate in combination with one another. I will also argue that the 
Democratic First Amendment is best read to adopt a particular vision of 
citizenship, one associated with the democratic-republican philosophy of 
Thomas Jefferson and his allies. Citizens, on this view, are meant to be 
active in a myriad of ways, to engage with and even challenge their elected 
representatives, and to develop and communicate their values and opinions 
3 Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic 
Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 258 n.29 (2004) (citing 
David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430, 448–50 (2002)); 2 RODNEY A. 
SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 22:6, Westlaw (database updated 2014). 
4 JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 62 (2012). 
5 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (2011). 
6 Id. at 389–90 (treating Petition and Speech Clauses as equivalent in the context of government 
employment). 
7 See generally INAZU, supra note 4, ch. 4. 
8 See, e.g., id.; RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS 
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF 
GRIEVANCES (2012); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American 
Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2011); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009). 
9 See Timothy Zick, Recovering the Assembly Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 375, 383–84 (2012) 
(making a similar criticism). 
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jointly, through assemblies and associations. It stands in sharp contrast to 
the passive form of citizenship, limited to biennial voting, favored by 
Jefferson’s Federalist adversaries and by some modern scholars. The First 
Amendment, in short, is both democratic and kaleidoscopic. 
I. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
In this Part, I will briefly review the origins and purposes of each of 
the five rights constituting the Democratic First Amendment. Essential 
antecedents to the American Bill of Rights include medieval English 
practices, the English Bill of Rights of 1689, and various post-
revolutionary state bills of rights, the most important of which is the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776. In addition, a full understanding of 
the drafting history must take account of George Mason’s Master Bill of 
Rights, which provided the template for many of the proposals for 
amendments that emerged from the state ratifying conventions,10 and for 
James Madison’s original proposed constitutional amendments, presented 
to Congress on June 8, 1789.11 Also relevant, of course, are subsequent 
revisions in Congress that produced the eventual amendments sent to the 
states. Obviously, in this short space, a thorough analysis of each of these 
complex histories is impossible, but even a summary yields important 
insights. 
As a starting point, it should be noted that the five rights constituting 
the Democratic First Amendment derive from four clauses in the text of the 
First Amendment—Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition12—along with 
one nontextual right, association. This list notably excludes the Religion 
Clauses.13 The reason for this is rooted in the distinct historical roots of the 
Religion Clauses. I have summarized this history in greater detail 
elsewhere,14 but briefly, if one looks at the antecedents to our Bill of 
Rights, it becomes clear that religious rights were seen as quite distinct 
from speech, press, assembly, and petition. In James Madison’s original 
proposals to Congress, the Religion Clauses were listed separately from 
10 GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CONST. SOC’Y ¶¶ 15, 16, 20, 
http://www.constitution.org/gmason/amd_gmas.htm [perma.cc/7N9P-MBC5]. 
11 Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8, 1789, CONST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.constitution.org/bor/amd_jmad.htm [perma.cc/P9JG-QRAE]. 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.”). 
13 Id. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . . .”). 
14 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental Values of 
Religious Groups, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 73, 92–93 (2014). 
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what became the rest of the First Amendment.15 More tellingly, in George 
Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights and in the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights of 1776, religious rights do not appear contiguously to speech, 
press, assembly, and petition (indeed, speech, assembly, and petition do not 
even appear in the Virginia Declaration).16 Finally, it is noteworthy that in 
the drafting process in Congress, the Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition 
Clauses were combined into one proposed amendment quite early.17 The 
Religion Clauses did not get combined with the others, however, until 
September 9, 1789, just weeks before final adoption, when the Senate did 
so without explanation.18 
What the above history demonstrates is that the Religion Clauses are 
different from the rest of the First Amendment and should be understood to 
have distinct roots and serve distinct goals. It does not, however, clearly 
establish that a relationship exists between the remaining provisions of the 
First Amendment, much less that they serve common, democratic goals. If 
one examines the roots of each of the democratic rights individually and in 
a bit of detail, however, such commonalities quickly become obvious. 
A. Freedom of Speech
Free speech lies at the center of the modern First Amendment. It 
seems likely that more ink, both judicial and scholarly, has been spilt 
discussing free speech than the rest of the First Amendment (including the 
Religion Clauses) put together—which makes it all the more interesting 
that the Free Speech Clause has the most shallow and obscure history of 
any provision of the First Amendment. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 
did not provide any protection for free speech (aside from the speech of 
members of Parliament),19 nor, as noted earlier, did the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights of 1776.20 Indeed, of the thirteen original states, only 
one—Pennsylvania—protected free speech in its state constitution.21 More 
generally, the great debates in the eighteenth century over free expression 
were entirely focused on the press; speech was at best an afterthought, 
15 Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison, supra note 11. 
16 GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10; THE VIRGINIA
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776) §§ 12, 16, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/
virginia_declaration_of_rights.html [perma.cc/665F-8ST7]. 
17 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 130 (Neil H. 
Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
18 Id. at 133, 139. 
19 ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp 
[perma.cc/U4NH-2KBS]. 
20 See VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
21 LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 5 (1985). 
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linked to freedom of the press but not terribly important.22 It is precisely 
this lack of history that has permitted such broad debates in recent years 
about the underlying functions of free speech. 
Despite this lack of history, however, as this Article began by noting, 
a broad consensus has emerged over the past half-century regarding the 
fundamental reason why the Constitution protects free speech: to advance 
democratic self-governance.23 This position has been defended ably by a 
vast array of First Amendment scholars including Robert Post,24 Jim 
Weinstein,25 Cass Sunstein,26 Robert Bork,27 and Alexander Meiklejohn.28 
The Supreme Court has reiterated the same thought repeatedly, both in 
majority opinions29 and in separate opinions by individual justices,30 
including most famously and originally in Justice Brandeis’s seminal 
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California.31 
Not only is the consensus about the fundamental purpose of the Free 
Speech Clause broad, it is entirely supported by history. As discussed 
earlier, during the Framing period, free speech principles were largely seen 
as linked to, and derivative of, press freedoms. As we shall soon see, 
however, there can be no serious doubt that the institutional function of 
freedom of the press has always been understood to be to preserve 
democracy and check government tyranny. Aside from its link to the press, 
moreover, there is good historical evidence that prior to the American 
22 Philip B. Kurland, The Original Understanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision of the 
First Amendment, 55 MISS. L.J. 225, 237 (1985). 
23 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
24 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011); Robert 
C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 670 (1990).
25 James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech 
Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 493–97 (2011). 
26 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121–24 (1993). 
27 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–21 
(1971). 
28 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 
(1961). 
29 See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) 
(“[T]he Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public, who are 
then able to influence the choices of a government . . . .”); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976) (per curiam); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 
(1964). 
30 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 787 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Wilkinson v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 399, 421–23, 422 n.11 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
31 274 U.S. 357, 372–79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For a discussion of the enormous 
influence of Brandeis’s Whitney opinion, see Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California: 
The Power of Ideas, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 383, 403–06 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 
2009). 
110:1097 (2016) Democratic First Amendment 
1103 
Revolution, the primary meaning of the term “freedom of speech” referred 
to the immunity that legislators enjoyed for their speeches on the floor of 
the legislature.32 This immunity was explicitly recognized in the English 
Bill of Rights.33 It was also protected by most colonial charters,34 and of 
course found its way into the U.S. Constitution in the form of the Speech 
and Debate Clause.35 It should be perfectly obvious, however, that 
immunizing the speech of legislators has no connection to putative First 
Amendment justifications such as individual self-fulfillment36 or the search 
for truth.37 The sole purpose of protecting legislative speech is advancing 
democratic self-governance by protecting the elected legislature—the 
representatives of the people—from royal tyranny. Insofar as the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment was seen to derive from these 
earlier legislative protections, presumably its function was understood in 
similar terms. 
B. Freedom of the Press
When we move beyond free speech to the rest of the First 
Amendment, the instrumental, democratic functions of the relevant rights 
become even more self-evident. Let us begin with speech’s cousin, 
freedom of the press. Whether and to what extent the press should be 
subject to regulation was a central issue of contention in both England and 
the colonies prior to the Revolution. In the seventeenth century the great 
debate was over licensing the press, but after licensing was abandoned in 
1694 in England (and soon thereafter in the colonies)38 the debate switched 
to the propriety of punishing the press, primarily for seditious libel.39 This 
history has produced a raging debate over whether the Press Clause of the 
First Amendment prohibits only licensing and other prior restraints, or also 
limits subsequent punishments.40 Regardless of the outcome of this debate, 
32 See David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 431 
(1983); Kurland, supra note 22, at 255. 
33 ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19. 
34 Bogen, supra note 32, at 431–34. 
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
36 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47–69 (1989); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4–7 (1966); see also Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1158–85 (2003). 
37 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
38 Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 651 
(1955). 
39 LEVY, supra note 21, 16–172 (detailing debates over permissibility of seditious libel 
prosecutions in both England and the United States). 
40 Compare LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY 
AMERICAN HISTORY (1960) (advocating a narrow, prior-restraints-only view), and Patterson v. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1104 
however, what is clear is that the framing generation understood that liberty 
of the press mattered.41 
Why did it matter? Antecedents of the Press Clause provide a fairly 
clear answer. As noted earlier, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 
protected the press, but not speech or assembly. Section 12 of the 
Declaration reads: “That the freedom of the press is one of the great 
bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic 
governments.”42 Similarly, § 16 of George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill 
of Rights reads: “That the People have a right to Freedom of speech, and of 
writing and publishing their Sentiments; that Freedom of the Press is one of 
the great Bulwarks of Liberty, and ought not to be violated.”43 Finally, 
James Madison’s original proposal to Congress copied Mason’s Master 
Draft almost verbatim.44 All of these formulations make it clear that the 
reason to protect the press is because it is a “bulwark”—i.e., a protector 
against external danger—of liberty. The external danger to be feared, of 
course, was despotic government. The press, in other words, was an 
essential tool for the preservation of liberal democracy because it kept the 
people informed of misbehavior by government officials, and so permitted 
a response—ideally through the democratic process, but if that was denied 
then through revolution. That the Press Clause plays this role has been 
acknowledged by hordes of commentators45 and is not really controversial. 
But this acknowledgement places the Press Clause squarely at the center of 
the Democratic First Amendment. 
C. Assembly
In addition to protecting expression (in the form of speech and the 
press), the First Amendment also guarantees “the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble.”46 As it turns out, in modern times the Assembly 
Clause has essentially disappeared from judicial discourse—the Supreme 
Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (same), with id. at 465 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (defending a broader reading of the Press Clause), Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297  U.S. 
233, 248 (1936) (same), ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1967, 
reprinted 2001) (same), and David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of 
Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985) (same). 
41 See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 487 (1983) 
(confirming the significance of press freedoms to the framing generation). 
42 THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 12. 
43 GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 16. 
44 Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8, 1789, supra note 15. 
45 See, e.g., Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633–34 (1975); Sonja R. 
West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1042 (2011); Anderson, supra note 41, at 
488–93. 
46 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Court has not addressed the Clause in over thirty years,47 and when issues 
arise regarding regulation of public gatherings, they are inevitably litigated 
under the public forum doctrine, which the Court treats as a branch of free 
speech law.48 It is noteworthy, however, that the framing generation did not 
consider assembly to be simply a subset of speech, and indeed, in 
Madison’s original proposed amendments (as in George Mason’s Master 
Draft), assembly did not even appear in the same provision as speech and 
press protections. What were the historical meaning and purposes of 
assembly? 
We can begin by eliminating a red herring. Because the Assembly 
Clause appears in close juxtaposition to the Petition Clause, separated by 
the word “and,” some commentators have suggested that the Assembly 
Clause only protects assemblies that are organized to prepare and present 
petitions to the government.49 As John Inazu has convincingly 
demonstrated, however, that reading is inconsistent with the drafting 
history, which clearly shows that the Framers viewed assembly and petition 
as distinct (albeit related) rights since Madison’s original proposal to 
Congress contained two separate rights—a right of “peaceably assembling 
and consulting for their common good,” and a right to petition for a redress 
of grievances—separated by a semicolon.50 
The true meaning of assembly is substantially clarified by an 
examination of antecedent versions of the Clause. Assembly is not an 
ancient right—it appears in neither the English Bill of Rights, nor the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776. Indeed, assemblies continued to be 
suppressed in England before and after the American Revolution.51 That 
makes the appearance of the assembly right in George Mason’s Master 
Draft noteworthy. Section 15 of the Draft, in full, reads as follows: “That 
the People have a Right peaceably to assemble together to consult for their 
common Good, or to instruct their Representatives, and that every Freeman 
has a right to petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of 
Grievances.”52 The assembly right is thus matched with the explicitly 
political right to instruct representatives, as well as the ancient, and also 
47 INAZU, supra note 4, at 62. 
48 See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002); Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 
505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
49 See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 713 (2002). 
50 INAZU, supra note 4, at 22–23; Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8, 
1789, supra note 15. 
51 Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the Limits of Legitimate 
Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1547 (2004). 
52 GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 15. 
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political (as we shall see) right to petition for a redress of grievances.53 
When Madison introduced his proposed amendments to Congress, he 
eliminated Mason’s proposed right to instruct representatives, but 
otherwise largely duplicated Mason’s language (with minor changes in 
wording).54 The proposed right, then, was that of the people to assemble to 
“consult[] for their common good.”55 The juxtaposition with the instruction 
and petition rights also makes clear that this consultation is for political 
purposes, in the people’s capacity as citizens. There can be no serious 
doubt that this new understanding of the importance of popular assemblies 
in democratic politics had been shaped by the experience of the American 
Revolution. After all, groups such as the Sons of Liberty, and raucous 
assemblies such as the Boston Tea Party (to say nothing of the events 
leading up to the Boston Massacre), played a central role in galvanizing 
and organizing resistance to British rule, and more broadly in the formation 
of the revolutionary ethos.56 Moreover, as the principle of popular 
sovereignty began to be broadly accepted in the post-revolutionary era, the 
importance of permitting sovereign citizens to consult with each other must 
have become increasingly clear, if that principle was to play a meaningful 
role in the new republic. 
Of course, the phrase “to consult for their common [g]ood” was 
eventually dropped from the language of the First Amendment. As is so 
often the case, however, the reasons for this change are obscure, but do not 
seem to have been driven by a desire to change the meaning of the 
Assembly Clause. There were several proposals in Congress to drop the 
“common good” language from the proposed amendment, but they were 
repeatedly defeated.57 As late as September 3, 1789, the Senate explicitly 
rejected a motion to drop the “common good” language.58 Then on 
September 9, with no explanation, it combined the Democratic First 
Amendment with the Religion Clauses, and dropped the language 
53 The fact that Mason placed the instruction right between assembly and petition obviously 
negates any notion that assembly is limited to petitioning assemblies. 
54 Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8, 1789, supra note 15 (“The people 
shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from 
applying to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress of their grievances.”). Madison’s 
primary change, then, was to rephrase the amendment as a restriction on government authority rather 
than a recognition of a right, but the substance is identical. 
55 Id. 
56 HARLOW GILES UNGER, AMERICAN TEMPEST: HOW THE BOSTON TEA PARTY SPARKED A
REVOLUTION (2011); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in 
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 878, 884–85 (1978). 
57 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 220–21, 232–33. 
58 Id. at 220. 
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“consulting for the common good.”59 The primary purpose of the 
September 9 changes appears to have been to shorten and combine the 
proposed amendments rather than to change their substantive content. All 
indications are that assembly was viewed as a political right, tied to 
citizenship in a system based on popular sovereignty, and there is no reason 
to believe that the rewording of the Assembly Clause was intended to alter 
that basic understanding. 
D. Association/Assembly II
Freedom of association is a right of group membership, meaning a 
right to form groups with fellow citizens, or to join preexisting groups. The 
Supreme Court has also interpreted association to include rights to 
anonymous membership,60 and to exclude members that a group objects 
to.61 The word “association” of course does not appear in the text of the 
First Amendment, but the Court has found “implicit in the right to engage 
in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to 
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”62 The origins and 
development of the modern right of association are highly convoluted 
subjects that have been recounted at length elsewhere,63 and can only be 
summarized in this space. Modern judicial recognition of a right of group 
membership can be traced to the 1927 decision in Whitney v. California, in 
which the Court affirmed Anita Whitney’s conviction for criminal 
syndicalism, based on her membership in the Communist Labor Party.64 
Though Whitney is often described (and taught) as a free speech case, it 
was conceded that Whitney herself had never spoken in favor of violence, 
the essence of syndicalism.65 Instead, she was prosecuted because of her 
membership in an organization that advocated criminal syndicalism—in 
other words, for her associational ties.66 Recognizing this, the majority 
59 Id. at 221–22. 
60 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958). 
61 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). 
62 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
63 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 983–89 (2011); INAZU, supra 
note 4, ch. 3, 4. 
64 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Criminal syndicalism was defined as “any doctrine or precept advocating, 
teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage . . . or unlawful acts of force and 
violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial 
ownership or control, or effecting any political change.” Id. at 359–60. 
65 Id. at 367; Bhagwat, supra note 31, at 387. 
66 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 366–67. 
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described the rights at issue as “free speech, assembly, and association,”67 
while Justice Brandeis’s separate opinion (which was also the leading 
judicial exposition of the self-governance reading of the First Amendment) 
spoke of “free speech and assembly.”68 Whitney and other cases from this 
era thus clearly recognize that the First Amendment protects a right of 
group membership, sometimes called a right of association and sometimes 
simply called assembly, and that this right derives squarely from the 
Assembly Clause.69 
It should also be noted that while judicial recognition of a right of 
group membership did not occur until the twentieth century, arguments to 
that effect can be traced back to the very origins of the republic, during the 
great debates over the Democratic-Republican societies in the mid-1790s.70 
These societies, groups of citizens united in support of the French 
Revolution, were highly controversial, especially among their Federalist 
political opponents. For our purposes, what is important is that supporters 
of the societies explicitly invoked the rights of association and assembly to 
defend their legitimacy.71 Indeed, even Federalist opponents of the 
societies, including John Adams, often described them as assemblies, albeit 
subversive and therefore illegal ones.72 Admittedly, not everyone supported 
such a reading of the First Amendment—Washington himself argued that 
while temporary gatherings of citizens were protected assemblies, 
permanent groups that arrogated to themselves the right to criticize elected 
officials were impermissible.73 And no doubt other Federalists shared his 
views—though, given that these same people shortly thereafter passed the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, their fealty to First Amendment principles might 
be questioned. Regardless, there has existed in the United States a long, 
albeit contested, tradition of recognizing group membership as a core First 
Amendment right. I will argue later in this Article that history supports the 
view that this tradition, associated with the Republican politics of Jefferson 
and Madison, is more closely reflected in the First Amendment than the 
countervailing Federalist perspective.74 
67 Id. at 371. 
68 Id. at 372–79 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
69 See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399–402, 409 (1950); Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530–32 (1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364–65 (1937). 
70 See generally Chesney, supra note 51; Mazzone, supra note 49, at 730–42. 
71 Chesney, supra note 51, at 1565 n.203, 1567–69. 
72 Id. at 1563, 1578–79. 
73 Id. at 1558–60; Mazzone, supra note 49, at 739–40. 
74 See infra Part III. 
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It must be acknowledged, however, that the modern Supreme Court no 
longer recognizes the broad right of association described above. Instead, 
since its 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,75 the Court 
has steadily narrowed the association right, redefining it as a right of 
“expressive association,” restricted to groups that engage in expressive 
activities, and one derived from and subsidiary to the right of free speech.76 
Nonexpressive associations, under the modern approach, receive no 
constitutional protection, and even expressive ones may be regulated with 
respect to their membership policies if the regulations do not interfere with 
their ability to communicate.77 It is clear, however, that these doctrinal 
developments are entirely inconsistent with the text and history of the First 
Amendment since they ignore the fact that the association right is 
historically rooted in the Assembly Clause, not the Speech Clause. They 
should therefore not be permitted to obscure our broader understanding of 
the Democratic First Amendment. 
Finally, once the history of the right of association/assembly is 
understood, its link to democratic self-governance becomes obvious. First 
of all, the right of group membership derives from the Assembly Clause, 
which, as we have already seen, has always been closely tied to democratic 
citizenship and self-governance. Second, as early as the 1790s, defenders of 
private associations—in particular, of the Democratic-Republican 
societies—argued that such groups were essential in a democracy to 
communicate the people’s wishes to public officials, and to act as sentinels 
against official misconduct.78 Third, the Supreme Court has itself 
repeatedly recognized that democratic politics require free associations of 
citizens.79 In short, once it is acknowledged that the First Amendment 
protects group membership, it becomes obvious beyond peradventure that 
the reason it does so is to enable and advance democratic self-governance. 
E. Petition
The last clause of the First Amendment protects “the right of the 
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”80 
Despite its modern obscurity, the petition right is in fact the most ancient of 
the First Amendment’s guarantees. Petitioning was practiced in pre-
75 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
76 These developments are described in detail in INAZU, supra note 4, ch. 3, 4. 
77 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626–27 (1984). 
78 Chesney, supra note 51, at 1539, 1549–50, 1569. 
79 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 
234, 250 (1957). 
80 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Norman England, and a partial right of petition (for Barons) was 
recognized in the Magna Carta.81 Petitions by the public, directed at both 
King and Parliament, became common during the Middle Ages,82 and 
crucially, the English Bill of Rights of 1689 codified an absolute right of 
“the subjects to petition the king,” further providing that “all commitments 
and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.”83 As such, petitioning 
government officials was a well-established right and practice, both in 
England and in the colonies, well before the American Revolution.84 
Petitioning was also an explicitly political practice well before the 
American Revolution. In the early days, petitions addressed largely private 
matters, and were really akin to modern judicial suits.85 By the seventeenth 
century, however, petitioning had evolved to the point where petitions 
regularly sought broader legislation or policy changes,86 and were also 
regularly presented by groups or associations formed for the purpose of 
petitioning.87 These petitioning practices, though they evolved in England, 
migrated fully to the American colonies.88 Indeed, probably because of a 
very different political culture, petitioning was more common, and more 
significant, in the colonies than in the mother country.89 And after the 
adoption of the Constitution, petitions began flowing to the First Congress 
immediately, well before the First Amendment was proposed or ratified.90 
There can also be no doubt about the essentially political nature of 
most petitioning. Petitioning, of course, can exist in the absence of 
democracy—as in medieval England—and even then can serve a political 
function. In the political culture of the early American Republic, however, 
petitioning served as a key tool by which citizens could communicate their 
wishes and desires to their elected representatives. Indeed, in an era when a 
large percentage of citizens were disenfranchised, petitioning was often one 
of the only forms of political participation available to those citizens.91 And 
even for voting citizens, petitioning provided a means to convey their 
wishes to representatives between elections. This is no doubt why George 
81 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 84–85. 
82 Id. at 85–86. 
83 ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19. 
84 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 86–88. 
85 Id. at 85–86. 
86 Id. at 86–87. 
87 Mazzone, supra note 49, at 722–23. 
88 Id. at 724–25. 
89 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 104–07. 
90 Id. at 10–11, 110–11. 
91 See Mazzone, supra note 49, at 729–30 (making a similar point). 
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Mason in his Master Draft placed the right to petition immediately after the 
people’s right to instruct their representatives (a right that Madison 
rejected)92—both were avenues for citizens to influence and control their 
legislators, aside from the crude tool of representative elections. 
In sum, what we find through a close examination of the First 
Amendment as a whole is that each of the five rights protected by the non-
religious parts of the Amendment—freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press, assembly, association, and petition—are important, independent 
rights with distinct histories. What they have in common, however, is that 
each of the rights has as its primary goal the advancement of democratic 
self-governance. Each, moreover, provides a distinct path for citizens to 
participate in and influence their government. Now we turn to the question 
of how these rights interact, and how they operate in tandem. 
II. COGNATE RIGHTS
In De Jonge v. Oregon, the Supreme Court reversed Dirk De Jonge’s 
conviction for criminal syndicalism, holding that the Assembly Clause of 
the First Amendment did not permit the State to criminalize simple 
attendance at a meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party.93 
The Court used these words to describe the assembly right and its 
significance:  
The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and 
free press and is equally fundamental. . . . ‘The very idea of a government, 
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably 
for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of 
grievances.’94 
Eight years later, in Thomas v. Collins,95 the Court reiterated this point 
in even stronger language. It spoke of “the preferred place given in our 
scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the 
First Amendment.”96 The Court then said the following: 
It is therefore in our tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, the 
narrowest range for its restriction, particularly when this right is exercised in 
conjunction with peaceable assembly. It was not by accident or coincidence 
that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single 
guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition 
92 GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 15. 
93 299 U.S. 353, 365–66 (1937). 
94 Id. at 364 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)). 
95 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
96 Id. at 530. 
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for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They 
are cognate rights . . . and therefore are united in the First Amendment’s 
assurance.97 
What did the Court mean when it described assembly and petition as 
“cognate rights” to freedom of speech and the press? And why did it 
describe these four rights as “democratic freedoms?” The answers to these 
questions go the heart of my argument in this Article. 
At first glance, the above questions seem trivial. These rights are 
“cognate” because they are similar in nature and share common roots (that 
is the definition of cognate98), and they are “democratic freedoms” because 
their common nature is that they all advance democratic self-governance. It 
turns out, however, that this simple answer hides a multitude of sins. In 
particular, it does not seriously address what exactly we mean by 
democratic self-governance, or how First Amendment freedoms advance 
that process. Once one delves into those questions, serious difficulties 
emerge. 
The problems began at the very beginning. The philosopher Alexander 
Meiklejohn was in his time (the mid-twentieth century) the leading 
academic exponent of the democratic reading of the First Amendment (or 
rather of the Free Speech Clause, which was Meiklejohn’s focus). 
Mieklejohn chose as his model for democratic self-governance a New 
England town meeting.99 Meiklejohn thus envisioned self-governance, and 
the activities protected by the First Amendment, as part of an organized, 
moderated event with strict, and strictly enforced, rules of procedure.100 
Speakers must have the floor to speak, must stay on topic, and must speak 
civilly.101 And at such meetings, the only things that happen are speeches, 
followed by votes. The purpose of the speeches presented at the meeting is 
to educate citizens and share views; consequently, Meiklejohn describes 
voter education as the sole purpose of speech and press freedoms.102 
Finally, one important implication of Meiklejohn’s democratic vision is 
97 Id. (citing De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364). 
98 See Cognate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cognate 
[perma.cc/PQ85-PK94]. 
99 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 24–25 (1979). 
100 Id. at 24 (“The moderator assumes, or arranges, that in the conduct of the business, certain rules 
of order will be observed.”). 
101 Id. at 24–25 (“[N]o one shall speak unless ‘recognized by the chair’ . . . debaters must confine 
their remarks to ‘the question before the house’” and “if [a speaker] is abusive or in other ways 
threatens to defeat the purpose of the meeting, he may be and should be declared ‘out of order.’”). 
102 Id. at 26 (explaining that the purpose of free speech is to ensure that voters are “made as wise as 
possible”). 
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that the significance of citizens, even as speakers, is truncated. As 
Meiklejohn put it: “What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but 
that everything worth saying shall be said.”103 
A moment’s thought should make clear what a radically incomplete 
vision of self-governance this is. Critically, it abstracts away from the 
representative nature of most American democracy (town meetings and 
popular referendums being the rare and narrow exceptions to that rule). It 
also ignores the vast complexities introduced by population size and 
diversity. Town meetings only work in small jurisdictions, usually with 
fairly homogenous populations. Representative democracy in the United 
States varies radically from this model, in almost every respect. In 
particular, the relative anonymity of citizens in large jurisdictions, the need 
for avenues by which citizens may effectively communicate with their 
representatives and be heard, and the possibility that citizens might help 
shape ideas, public opinion, and the broader culture rather than being 
passive targets of education, are all absent from the town meeting model. 
A related point is that the Meiklejohn model reduces the Democratic 
First Amendment to the Speech Clause and perhaps the Press Clause. There 
is no need and no room in the town meeting model for assembly, for 
associations of citizens, and for petitions directed at representatives. 
Instead, citizens act directly by voting on legislation after interacting 
directly with each other. This is not the way real citizens experience real 
democracy in the United States, and it is not the vision of democracy 
encapsulated in the First Amendment. 
The shortcomings of Meiklejohn’s vision are shared, though to a 
lesser degree, by two leading modern expositions of the relation between 
democracy and the First Amendment: Robert Post’s concept of public 
discourse and Cass Sunstein’s concept of public deliberation. Beginning 
with Post, in his book Constitutional Domains,104 Dean Post argues that the 
concept of “public discourse” has played a central role in the development 
of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine.105 While Post never 
provides a single definition of public discourse, he appears to equate the 
concept with speech relevant to democratic self-governance, albeit with 
some ultimately arbitrary limitations.106 He also emphasizes that because of 
the importance of public discourse and the diversity of the American 
103 Id. 
104 ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 
(1995). 
105 Id. at 119. 
106 The examples Post gives of such limitations are the exclusion from protected speech of fighting 
words, vulgarity, or indecency accessible to children, and obscenity. Id. at 174–77. 
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public, the First Amendment has been interpreted to protect even highly 
intemperate and uncivil speech, so long as it falls within the broad 
definition of public discourse.107 Indeed, Post argues that the American 
concept of public discourse is entirely dependent on that diversity, because 
it is the very act of communicating across different communities and 
different cultural values that makes discourse public.108 
Cass Sunstein’s vision of the First Amendment shares many 
similarities with Robert Post’s vision, albeit with different emphases. 
Indeed, Post acknowledges this parallel by citing Sunstein in the very first 
footnote of his chapter on public discourse.109 Rather than focusing on 
public discourse, Sunstein argues that the constitutional significance of free 
speech is that it creates “a system of democratic deliberation.”110 From this 
premise, Sunstein concludes that we have a “‘two tier’ First Amendment,” 
which grants greater protection for political speech than other forms of 
speech.111 He in turn defines speech as political “when it is both intended 
and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue.”112 
Sunstein then goes on to discuss in detail why some forms of speech, such 
as art and literature, are generally political,113 while other forms, such as 
pornography, are not.114 
From these brief descriptions, the parallels between Post’s and 
Sunstein’s visions of free speech are clear. Both would favor speech related 
to democracy over other speech. Both emphasize public debate as the key 
value advanced by the First Amendment. And both emphasize the benefits 
of diversity and heterogeneity, seeing these aspects of American 
democracy as strengthening rather than weakening public discourse and 
deliberation, respectively.115 There are also some important differences 
between the two. In particular, Sunstein’s more narrow focus on 
deliberation, rather than discourse, suggests that he would be less tolerant 
of uncivil speech than Post116—though to be sure, Sunstein concedes that 
107 Id. at 137–40. 
108 Id. at 141–42. 
109 Id. at 119, 371 n.1. 
110 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH xviii (1995). 
111 Id. at 122. 
112 Id. at 130 (emphasis omitted). 
113 Id. at 152–53. 
114 Id. at 215–16. 
115 POST, supra note 104, at 141–42; SUNSTEIN, supra note 110, at 242. 
116 See POST, supra note 104, at 119 (suggesting that Civil Republicans such as Sunstein and Frank 
Michelman would not protect uncivil speech, which undermines deliberation). 
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“racist and sexist speech usually falls within the free speech ‘core.’”117 For 
our purposes, however, the key is the commonality. 
Post’s and Sunstein’s First Amendment theories are insightful and, to 
a substantial extent, convincing. They are also, however, incomplete, in 
some of the same ways as Meiklejohn’s approach. To be fair, both Post and 
Sunstein are more convincing and more nuanced than Meiklejohn because 
both of them, unlike Meiklejohn, take into account the importance of 
cultural diversity to American democracy. Post also makes the important 
point that Meiklejohn’s highly managed description of democracy, based 
on the town meeting, is inconsistent with the premise that citizens may 
contest not just substantive issues of policy, but also how a democracy 
should procedurally operate.118 Indeed, he dedicates an entire chapter of 
Constitutional Domains to this point, calling it “Meiklejohn’s Mistake.”119 
Nevertheless, Post and Sunstein share with Meiklejohn one important 
thing: a myopic focus on speech, ignoring the rest of the Democratic First 
Amendment. Sunstein concedes his focus in the very title of his book. And 
although Post speaks regularly about “the First Amendment,” his focus too 
is entirely on speech. There are, however, entire aspects of citizenship that 
this ignores, including collective action, emotional appeals, and demands 
upon political leaders. But these types of activities are no less protected by 
the First Amendment than polite discourse on public issues. 
It is here, of course, that we enter the realm of the broader Democratic 
First Amendment: the rights of assembly, association, and petition. At one 
point in his discussion of public discourse, Post posits that a critical 
function of such discourse is “collective self-definition,” meaning the 
creation of a shared public identity that in turn “enables a culturally 
heterogeneous society to forge a common democratic will.”120 He also 
argues that this process is an essential aspect of citizenship protected by the 
First Amendment. I completely agree with the latter point, but do not see 
this as a theory of speech. Instead, I would argue that for individual 
citizens, forming and joining in groups with other citizens is even more 
important to self-definition than public discourse—indeed, it is necessarily 
groups that make this process “collective.” Post’s and Sunstein’s visions of 
democracy, and of public debate, are notably individualistic. Citizens are 
viewed as speaking as individuals to other individuals, and through this 
public process of discourse or deliberation, reaching joint conclusions. Post 
117 SUNSTEIN, supra note 110, at 122. 
118 POST, supra note 104, at 270–75. 
119 Id. at ch. 7. 
120 Id. at 166. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1116 
in particular confirms this point early in his book by describing “individual 
autonomy” as an essential prerequisite of democracy.121 But again, this is 
not how real citizens experience either democracy or public debate. 
Certainly, voting is a solitary experience. But when citizens want to act in a 
political capacity, they almost always do so through groups, whether it be 
formal entities such as political parties, the NRA, and the Sierra Club, or 
more informal gatherings such as Occupy. They discover and develop their 
values and identities through such groups, and it is only through such 
groups that individual citizens can hope to be heard, either by other citizens 
or by public officials. In other words, association is essential to citizenship. 
Unsurprisingly, assembly plays a similar role, given the common roots 
of the association and assembly rights.122 When citizens assemble—
meaning gather together physically (or perhaps virtually as well)123—
entirely new avenues of political participation and citizenship are opened. 
For one thing, as noted earlier, the original phrasing of the assembly right 
was the right of the people “peaceably to assemble together to consult for 
their common Good.”124 This sounds like precisely the sort of “collective 
self-definition” that Post attributes to public discourse; but the Assembly 
Clause envisions this as a collective activity requiring physical presence as 
well as, of course, words. Assemblies, like associations, permit citizens to 
magnify their voices manyfold, and so vastly increase the possibility that 
they will be heard. Finally, assemblies of citizens do more than develop or 
convey specific views about public issues. They also send a signal of 
strength and solidarity, which can be as or more important than the 
“message.” Indeed, some assemblies—such as Occupy—can be notably 
incoherent in their “message,” but that does not necessarily reduce their 
political and social significance. Sometimes, in the case of assembly, what 
matters is numbers and cohesion, not discourse or deliberation. 
Petitioning seems different from association and assembly, and more 
like speech, because it is not inherently collective, and because it 
necessarily consists of words, albeit in the modern era written words.125 But 
petitioning is also meaningfully distinct from most speech. For one thing, 
121 Id. at 7. 
122 See supra Part II. 
123 See John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2013). 
124 GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 15. 
125 In its early forms, petitioning appears to have been primarily oral—the Magna Carta, for 
example, recognizes a right of Barons to come to the King and lay before him transgressions. 
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 84–85. Obviously, however, as literacy spread and the scale of 
petitioning increased, petitioning became a primarily written exercise, as reflected by the fact that even 
today, in the British Parliament, a bag hangs on the back of the chair of the Speaker of the House of 
Commons to receive petitions. Id. at 83. 
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petitions are not broad discussions of public issues, they are specific calls 
for action, directed at a specific class of individuals: public officials. Cass 
Sunstein describes the goal of our “system of free expression” as “to ensure 
broad communication about matters of public concern among the citizenry 
at large and between citizens and representatives.”126 That is certainly true, 
but misses the point that petitioning is a specific form of communication 
between citizen and representative that is quite distinct from either 
discourse or deliberation. It is, rather, an antecedent for action (or at least 
hoped to be so). One strong indication of the distinctive nature of petitions 
was that historically, petition, unlike speech, was considered to require a 
(legislative) response.127 Secondly, it is not quite true that petitioning is not 
a collective activity. While historically petitioning developed as a means 
for individuals to bring private grievances to leaders,128 petitioning had 
evolved well before the American Revolution into a means for groups of 
citizens to request action on broader public policy issues.129 Moreover, in 
England and in the colonies, group petitioning was closely linked to 
preexisting associations, and such petitions were important avenues for 
political participation for citizens, including otherwise disenfranchised 
ones.130 In short, petitioning, like association and assembly, has historically 
played a central role in our democracy, and so cannot be ignored if the 
actual relationship between democracy and the First Amendment is to be 
understood properly. 
Democratic theories which focus on speech alone rather than the 
broader Democratic First Amendment are not only too narrow, but they 
also lead to a misunderstanding about the fundamental nature of American 
democracy. Meiklejohn, Post, and Sunstein focus not just exclusively on 
speech, but on one particular type of speech: public debate over political, 
social, or policy issues. This debate, moreover, is envisioned in a particular 
way. Meiklejohn describes a civilized debate following rules of order.131 
Post emphasizes that public discourse, to be effective, must constitute 
“rational deliberation” (though he concedes that this requirement is in deep 
tension with his tolerance for incivility).132 And Sunstein’s description of 
democratic deliberation is quintessentially rational.133 This is not 
126 SUNSTEIN, supra note 110, at 19. 
127 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 6, 11. 
128 Id. at 83, 85–86. 
129 Id. at 86, 88. 
130 Mazzone, supra note 49, at 722–25. 
131 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 99, at 24–26. 
132 POST, supra note 104, at 145–47. 
133 SUNSTEIN, supra note 110, at 18–19. 
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surprising—after all, speech is widely associated in our culture with 
rationality. But real democracy does not work this way, nor does the 
broader Democratic First Amendment. Rational discourse is certainly (at 
least ideally) a part of our system of self-governance, but it is just a part. 
Associations can bond citizens on profoundly emotional terms such as love 
of nature (the Sierra Club) or guns (the NRA), with no need for rational 
explanation. And assemblies often send profoundly emotional messages of 
joy or rage, with little attempt at rationality. Antiwar rallies are not like 
debate club meetings. And while Martin Luther King, Jr. was a profoundly 
thoughtful man, nobody believes that the effectiveness of the civil rights 
protests he led stemmed only or primarily from rational arguments as to the 
justness of their cause. Indeed, sometimes, as arguably with Occupy and 
Donald Trump rallies, the only message sent by an assembly is one of rage, 
and demand for largely undefined change. This is not discourse or 
deliberation, but it is surely a part of our democracy. 
One final point is in order about the workings of the Democratic First 
Amendment. Until now, I have emphasized the fact that the rights of 
association, assembly, and petition are as important as speech and the press 
to an effective democracy, and that all of these rights share common roots 
and purposes. They are distinct rights but, as the Supreme Court has said, 
“cognate.”134 To say that they are distinct, however, is not to say they are 
unrelated. To the contrary, these rights usually operate in combination with 
one another, and are much more effective in combination as well. A 
complete discussion of how these democratic rights interact is impossible 
in this space,135 but some relationships are obvious. Speech is the lifeblood 
of associations, because the formation and activities of associations require 
speech. Group petitioning is fundamentally linked to assembly, since 
before the advent of mass, electronic communication, assemblies were the 
only means to create such petitions. Speech is greatly enhanced by 
association and assembly, because speech on behalf of large groups of 
citizens is far more likely to influence others (including public officials) 
than that of individuals acting alone. Indeed, the interrelationship between 
these rights is so deep that sometimes they blend together, creating a 
kaleidoscopic effect. 
These relationships are not just theoretical, they are real and 
historically demonstrable. Thus in Ron Krotoszynski’s discussion of the 
Selma March of 1965, he concedes that “the event was a synthesis of 
speech, assembly, association, and petition,” though his focus is on the 
134 See supra text accompanying notes 93–98. 
135 For a more complete discussion of these relationships, see Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 995–99. 
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last.136 Tabatha Abu El-Haj’s description of street politics similarly reveals 
an unrestrained mixture of speech, association, assembly, and sometimes 
petitioning, although her particular focus is on assembly.137 And Larry 
Kramer has noted the fundamental importance in the colonial period of a 
combination of assembly and petitioning, as a means of political 
participation.138 It is these forms of collective, complex actions combining 
groups, assemblies, speech, and petitions that have given American 
democracy its vibrancy. 
The kaleidoscopic nature of the Democratic First Amendment has an 
important consequence: it means that studies which focus exclusively on 
one or two rights of the Democratic First Amendment will necessarily 
produce an impoverished vision of the First Amendment, and of its 
relationship to democracy. Once the First Amendment is seen as a whole, a 
clearer and more accurate picture emerges of how American democracy 
functions, and why the First Amendment in its entirety is an essential part 
of that process. 
There is, however, one piece of the puzzle unresolved: how the 
Democratic First Amendment interacts with the representative nature of 
American democracy. As noted earlier, one of the key weaknesses of 
Meiklejohn’s description of American democracy is that he neglects its 
representative nature. There are, as we shall see, similar ambiguities about 
how Post’s public discourse, as well as Sunstein’s democratic deliberation, 
fit into a representative system. As it turns out, the role of democratic rights 
in a representative system of democracy raises some rather complicated 
questions, reflecting sharp disputes in the early Republic about the 
fundamental nature of citizenship in a representative system. It is to these 
questions that we now turn. 
III. MODELS OF CITIZENSHIP
Ours is a representative democracy. Aside from a handful of narrow 
exceptions—mainly town meetings in New England, and the various 
popular initiative processes that emerged during the Progressive era—
essentially all laws in this country are adopted by legislatures made up of 
elected representatives.139 Indeed, in Federalist No. 10, Madison invoked 
136 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 12–13. 
137 Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 554–61 (2009). 
138 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 25–27 (1994). 
139 Cf. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (holding a constitutional 
challenge to a provision authorizing popular initiatives added to Oregon Constitution in 1902 was 
nonjusticiable). 
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the representative nature of the system it created as a major strength of the 
new Constitution.140 This obvious point, however, creates some difficulties 
for democratic First Amendment theory. The difficulty, in a nutshell, is that 
if laws are to be made by elected representatives, of what use is public 
debate on policy issues among citizens who have no direct say over 
legislation? And for that matter, what is the relevance of other forms of 
citizen activism, including association and assembly, in such a system?141 
The answer to both these questions at first glance seems obvious—
even if citizens do not directly make laws, they do vote to choose 
representatives, and surely First Amendment liberties are relevant to that 
process of choosing. Perhaps, but perhaps not. As it turns out, it all depends 
on what we believe to be the nature of representation. When citizens select 
legislative representatives, they do not vote solely, or even necessarily 
primarily, based on the substantive policy positions adopted by the 
candidates. This is true for two reasons: first, because no candidate can 
possibly match all of a voter’s policy preferences, compromise is 
necessary; second, and more importantly, representatives are not meant to 
be simple conduits for the views of their constituents. Rather, they are 
supposed to, as Madison puts it, use their “wisdom [to] discern the true 
interest of their country.”142 In a similar vein, Cass Sunstein has 
convincingly argued that the choice of the First Congress to refuse to 
include in the Bill of Rights a right to instruct one’s representatives (and for 
that matter, Madison’s choice to drop that provision from George Mason’s 
Master Draft) clearly reflected the view that representatives were to 
deliberate with their colleagues with an open mind on the issues before 
them.143 But this again suggests that citizens should choose representatives 
based on their “wisdom,” knowledge, and open-mindedness, not based on 
their substantive positions. And if that is the case, what is the point of 
substantive discussions among citizens? 
For Meiklejohn, the tension described above appears to be 
irresolvable. He avoids it simply by assuming (inaccurately) that our 
democracy is a direct one, analogous to town meetings.144 Post does not 
directly address the issue. It is in Sunstein’s work, however, that this 
ambiguity is most apparent. Throughout his book Democracy and the 
140 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46–47 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). 
141 The one First Amendment right that, of course, has no difficulty with representative democracy 
is petitioning, which is meaningful only in a representative system, since in a direct democracy voters 
can hardly petition themselves. 
142 FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 140, at 46–47. 
143 SUNSTEIN, supra note 110, at 242. 
144 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 99, at 24–26. 
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Problem of Free Speech, Sunstein insists on the deliberative nature of 
American democracy.145 He is, however, studiously ambiguous about who 
exactly is supposed to be doing this deliberation. Most of the time, he 
appears to envision citizens doing the deliberating, since he ties 
deliberation to speech by citizens.146 When he discusses the rejected right of 
instruction, however, he clearly views deliberation as occurring among 
representatives.147 But of course, it matters a great deal from a First 
Amendment perspective which model we believe better reflects American 
democracy. 
As it turns out, this conflict between two different models of 
representation can be traced to the very beginnings of our Republic, as 
revealed by two major political crises: the debate over the Democratic-
Republican societies during the Washington Administration, and the 
controversy surrounding the Sedition Act during the first Adams 
Administration. In each of these instances, disputes between Federalists, 
led by John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, and Republicans, led by 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, brought to the fore two distinct 
views about the role of citizens in a representative democracy. 
The Democratic-Republican societies were private groups of citizens, 
supportive of the French Revolution, which operated in the United States 
between 1793 and 1795. Their history has been recounted in detail 
elsewhere, notably by Robert M. Chesney, and will not be repeated here.148 
Unsurprisingly, the societies were generally associated with Jeffersonian 
Republicans, who were generally Francophiles, and opposed by the 
Federalists, with their more Anglophile orientation. For our purposes, the 
key fact is that the Federalist objection to the societies was based on their 
view that such groups had no place in a representative system. As both 
Chesney and James P. Martin discuss in detail, the Federalist vision of 
representative government was that citizens should elect their 
representatives based on their abilities, but then leave deliberation over 
public issues to those representatives.149 A corollary of this narrow view of 
citizenship was that permanent, private groups of citizens dedicated to 
political issues, including critiquing representatives, were entirely 
145 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 110, passim. 
146 Id. at xvii, 19, 130, 244–45. 
147 Id. at 242. 
148 Chesney, supra note 51, passim; see also John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 
84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 577–81 (2010); Mazzone, supra note 49, at 734–42. 
149 James P. Martin, When Repression is Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of 
Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 129–30, 174 (1999); Chesney, 
supra note 51, at 1542–43. 
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illegitimate. Only representatives could speak for the people, and when 
private groups purported to do so, they violated basic democratic 
precepts.150 Ultimately, when President Washington endorsed this critique 
in a speech, the societies were forced to disband because of Washington’s 
unmatched prestige.151 And a few years later, similar thinking led to the 
adoption by a Federalist-dominated Congress and President Adams of the 
Sedition Act of 1798, which explicitly prohibited both organized 
opposition to government measures and seditious speech about the 
government.152 
What is noteworthy about the Federalist model of citizenship in 
representative democracies is how restricted a role it leaves for the liberties 
protected by the Democratic First Amendment. Criticism of the work of 
representatives is generally suspect, and indeed, citizens and the press were 
not generally expected to consider the wisdom of legislation at all.153 
Permanent associations of citizens, or at least those directed at political 
issues, were also highly suspect because they were usurping the exclusive 
role of elected officials as representatives of the people.154 At most, what 
citizens could do in this model was occasionally assemble in public to 
discuss matters, without any permanent groups or structures,155 and in case 
of great need, address petitions to their representatives to communicate 
their views.156 
This stunted view of citizenship and of the First Amendment is of 
course entirely inconsistent with modern sensibilities and with modern 
readings of the First Amendment. It is important to note, however, that the 
Federalist model did not go unchallenged even during the 1790s. Rather, 
Republican supporters of the societies and later opponents of the Sedition 
Act, including Madison and Jefferson, articulated a strong vision of 
citizenship which was much more active. The Republicans also explicitly 
recognized the importance of political associations as a form of 
intermediation between citizens and the state, and as vehicles through 
which citizens could safely and effectively articulate criticism of 
government policies.157 Significantly, these arguments in support of active 
150 Martin, supra note 149, at 126–27, 134–35, 152–53; Chesney, supra note 51, at 1542–43, 
1578–79. 
151 Chesney, supra note 51, at 1560–74. 
152 Id. at 1574–75; Martin, supra note 149, at 122–23. 
153 Martin, supra note 149, at 126–27, 144–45, 174; Chesney, supra note 51, at 1542, 1560–62. 
154 Chesney, supra note 51, at 1542–43, 1560–61; Martin, supra note 149, at 132–34, 144, 152–53. 
155 Martin, supra note 149, at 171; Chesney, supra note 51, at 1558–60. 
156 Chesney, supra note 51, at 1543; Martin, supra note 149, at 160–66. 
157 Chesney, supra note 51, at 1565–69. 
110:1097 (2016) Democratic First Amendment 
1123 
citizenship were often tied directly and explicitly to First Amendment 
rights.158 And at the end of the decade, Republicans reprised and expanded 
these arguments to develop their arguments against the Sedition Act of 
1798, which were ultimately politically (if not legally) successful.159 
In short, what becomes relatively clear is that in the very early 
American Republic, two very different models of citizenship in a 
representative democracy coexisted with each other. One, the Federalist 
model, envisioned a largely passive, respectful, and subordinate citizenry. 
The other, the Republican model, was much more active, collective, 
disrespectful, and even sometimes incendiary. It is doubtful if either side 
had fully thought out its competing vision before being forced to do so 
during the great crises of the 1790s, but obviously both views had to have 
been latent in their thinking before then. The vision of the Democratic First 
Amendment that I have outlined above is entirely consistent with the 
Republican model, but not with the Federalist one. As a matter of positive 
law, the Supreme Court, as well as essentially all scholars, have obviously 
adopted the Republican model. I would argue that this is entirely justified, 
as a matter of history and common sense. After all, the Federalists were not 
the original proponents of the First Amendment, or any Bill of Rights; to 
the contrary, they opposed such amendments consistently. The Bill of 
Rights was championed by Jefferson,160 and by anti-Federalist opponents of 
the Constitution,161 many of whom (such as James Monroe) eventually 
became part of the Republican movement. And it was, of course, James 
Madison who actually introduced the Bill of Rights into Congress. Given 
this uncontroverted background, it seems entirely appropriate to read the 
political rights of the Democratic First Amendment from a Jeffersonian-
Republican angle. 
CONCLUSION 
The five rights of the Democratic First Amendment—speech, press, 
assembly, association, and petitioning—are the linchpins of American 
democracy. They protect and nurture the sort of active citizenship and 
collective action that have been the lifeblood of our system of government 
since its founding. As this Article demonstrates, however, in recent years 
158 Id. at 1565 n.203, 1567–68. 
159 See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME ch. 1 (2004);
LEVY, supra note 21, at 301–23. 
160 See PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 69–70 (1999); 1 THE
REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 
1776–1826, at 512–13 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995). 
161 See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT WERE THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS FOR ch. 8 (1981). 
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the judiciary has restricted, and largely forgotten the independent 
significance of many of these rights, focusing instead myopically on free 
speech. These developments are deeply unfortunate for two related reasons. 
First, this judicial truncation of the First Amendment is inconsistent with 
the deeper structure and purposes of the Amendment. Sensible 
interpretation requires attention to structure and purpose, regardless of 
one’s interpretational philosophy. As a result, failure to attend to structure 
and purpose leads to interpretations and outcomes that lack both internal 
cohesion and logical justification. 
Second, these developments impose substantial barriers to a revival of 
the kind of active citizenship that our democracy desperately needs. The 
reason, quite simply, is that the Court’s current fragmented and narrow 
approach to the First Amendment regularly leads to the narrowing or even 
eradication of important democratic rights. Nonexpressive, but politically 
relevant associations are unprotected under current law.162 Reliance on free 
speech doctrine exclusively permits the state to impose time, place, and 
manner restrictions on public assemblies that are stifling in practice, and 
inconsistent with the Assembly Clause in principle.163 And the right to 
petition has been stripped of the legal immunity that it was historically 
accorded.164 In combination, such judicial abdication results in systematic 
underprotection of important political movements such as Occupy and 
Black Lives Matter, which are some of the primary vehicles for active 
citizenship in contemporary America. There are signs all around us that the 
American people may be ready for a revival of active citizenship. But 
unless courts are willing to reinvigorate the Democratic First Amendment, 
that revival risks being hobbled by unnecessary and unconstitutional 
restrictions on the ability of citizens to associate, to assemble in public 
places, and to force public officials to attend to their demands. 
162 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612, 626–27 (1984) (denying associational protection to 
U.S. Jaycees, a national membership corporation that nurtures the development of young men’s civic 
organizations, because admitting women as full voting members did not impair its male members’ 
freedom of expressive association). 
163 Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323–24 (2002) (upholding an ordinance requiring 
individuals to acquire permits for large assemblies in public parks); Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of 
Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding denial of protestors’ request to modify a designated 
demonstration zone at 2004 Democratic National Convention because prohibition was content-neutral). 
164 McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (permitting libel claim based on statements in 
petitions to national officials). 
